CACI No. 4302. Termination for Failure to Pay Rent - Essential Factual Elements

Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (2024 edition)

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4302 . T ermination for Failure to Pay Rent - Essential Factual

[ Name of plaintiff ] claims that [ name of defendant ] [and [ name of

subtenant ], a subtenant of [ name of defendant ],] no longer [has/have] the

right to occupy the property because [ name of defendant ] has failed to

pay the rent. T o establish this claim, [ name of plaintiff ] must prove all of

the following:

1. That [ name of plaintiff ] [owns/leases] the property;

2. That [ name of plaintiff ] [rented/subleased] the property to [ name of

3. That under the [lease/rental agreement/sublease], [ name of

defendant ] was required to pay rent in the amount of $[ specify

amount ] per [ specify period, e.g., month ];

4. That [ name of plaintiff ] properly gave [ name of defendant ] three

days’ written notice to pay the rent or vacate the property;

5. That as of [ date of three-day notice ], at least the amount stated in

the three-day notice was due;

6. That [ name of defendant ] did not pay the amount stated in the

notice within three days after [service/receipt] of the notice; and

7. That [ name of defendant ] [or subtenant [ name of subtenant ]] is still

occupying the property.

New August 2007; Revised June 201 1, December 201 1, December 2013, May 2021

Directions for Use

Modify this instruction as necessary for rent due on a residential tenancy between

March 1, 2020, and June 30, 2021, including, but not limited to, substitution of the

term “fifteen business days” wherever the term “three days” appears in the essential

factual elements. (See COVID-19 T enant Relief Act, Code Civ . Proc., § 1 179.01 et

seq.; Stats. 2021, ch. 2 (Sen. Bill 91), Code Civ . Proc., § 1 179.02.)

Include the bracketed references to a subtenancy in the opening paragraph and in

element 7 if persons other than the tenant-defendant are occupying the premises.

If the plaintif f is the landlord or owner , select “owns” in element 1, “rented” in

element 2, and either “lease” or “rental agreement” in element 3. Commercial

documents are usually called “leases” while residential documents are often called

“rental agreements.” Select the term that is used on the written document. If the

plaintif f is a tenant seeking to recover possession from a subtenant, select “leases”

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in element 1, “subleased” in element 2, and “sublease” in element 3. (Code Civ .

Proc., § 1 161(3).)

Defective service may be waived if defendant admits receipt of notice. (See V alov v .

T ank (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 867, 876 [214 Cal.Rptr . 546].) However, if the fact of

service is contested, compliance with the statutory requirements must be shown.

( Palm Pr operty Investments, LLC v . Y adegar (201 1) 194 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1425

[123 Cal.Rptr .3d 816].) Therefore, this instruction does not provide an option for the

jury to determine whether or not defective service was waived if there was actual

If a commercial lease requires service by a particular method, actual receipt by the

tenant will not cure the landlord’ s failure to comply with the service requirements of

the lease. ( Culver Center Partners East #1, L.P . v . Baja Fr esh W estlake V illage, Inc.

(2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 744, 752 [1 10 Cal.Rptr .3d 833].) Whether the same rule

applies to a residential lease that specifies a method of service has not yet been

If the lease specifies a time period for notice other than the three-day period,

substitute that time period in elements 4, 5, and 6, provided that it is not less than

three days.

There is a conflict in the case law with respect to when the three-day period begins

if substituted service is used. Compare Davidson v . Quinn (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d

Supp. 9, 14 [188 Cal.Rptr . 421] [tenant must be given three days to pay , so period

does not begin until actual notice is received] with W alters v . Meyers (1990) 226

Cal.App.3d Supp. 15, 19-20 [277 Cal.Rptr . 316] [notice is effective when posted

and mailed]. This conflict is accounted for in element 6.

See CACI No. 4303, Suffıciency and Service of Notice of T ermination for Failure to

Pay Rent , for an instruction regarding proper notice.

Sources and Authority

• Unlawful Detainer for T enant’ s Default in Rent Payments. Code of Civil

Procedure section 1 161(2).

• COVID-19 T enant Relief Act. Code of Civil Procedure section 1 179.01 et seq.

• Senate Bill 91 (Stats. 2021, ch. 2). Code of Civil Procedure section 1 179.02 et

• T enant Protection Act of 2019. Civil Code section 1946.2.

• Conversion to Civil Action if Possession No Longer at Issue. Civil Code section

• “[M]ere failure of a tenant to quit the premises during the three-day notice

period does not necessarily justify an unlawful detainer action. If a tenant

vacates the premises and surrenders possession to the landlord prior to the

complaint being filed, then no action for unlawful detainer will lie even though

the premises were not surrendered during the notice period. This is true because

the purpose of an unlawful detainer action is to recover possession of the

UNLA WFUL DET AINER CACI No. 4302

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premises for the landlord. Since an action in unlawful detainer involves a

forfeiture of the tenant’ s right to possession, one of the matters that must be

pleaded and proved for unlawful detainer is that the tenant remains in possession

of the premises. Obviously this cannot be established where the tenant has

surrendered the premises to landlord prior to the filing of the complaint. In such

a situation the landlord’ s remedy is an action for damages and rent.” ( Briggs v .

Electr onic Memories & Magnetics Corp. (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 900, 905-906

[126 Cal.Rptr . 34], footnote and internal citations omitted.)

• “Proper service on the lessee of a valid three-day notice to pay rent or quit is an

essential prerequisite to a judgment declaring a lessor ’ s right to possession under

section 1 161, subdivision 2. A lessor must allege and prove proper service of the

requisite notice. Absent evidence the requisite notice was properly served

pursuant to section 1 162, no judgment for possession can be obtained.”

( Liebovich v . Shahrokhkhany (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 51 1, 513 [65 Cal.Rptr .2d

457], internal citations omitted.)

• “Section 1 162 does not authorize service of a three-day notice to pay rent or quit

by mail delivery alone, certified or otherwise. It provides for service by: personal

delivery; leaving a copy with a person of suitable age and discretion at the

renter ’ s residence or usual place of business and sending a copy through the

mail to the tenant’ s residence ; or posting and delivery of a copy to a person

there residing, if one can be found, and sending a copy through the mail. Strict

compliance with the statute is required.” ( Liebovich, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p.

516, original italics, internal citations omitted.)

• “In the cases discussed . . . , a finding of proper service turned on a party’ s

acknowledgment or admission the notice in question was in fact received. In the

present case, defendant denied, in his answer and at trial, that he had ever

received the three-day notice. Because there was no admission of receipt in this

case, service by certified mail did not establish or amount to personal delivery .

Further , there was no evidence of compliance with any of the three methods of

service of a three-day notice to pay rent or quit provided in [Code of Civil

Procedure] section 1 162. Therefore, the judgment must be reversed.” ( Liebovich,

supra , 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 518.)

• “[Code of Civil Procedure section 1 162 specifies] three ways in which service of

the three-day notice may be ef fected on a residential tenant: . . . . As explained

in Liebovich, supra , . . . , ‘[w]hen the fact of service is contested, compliance

with one of these methods must be shown or the judgment must be reversed.’ ”

( Palm Pr operty Investments, LLC, supra , 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1425.)

• “If the tenant gives up possession of the property after the commencement of an

unlawful detainer proceeding, the action becomes an ordinary one for damages.”

( Fish Construction Co. v . Moselle Coach W orks, Inc. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d

654, 658 [196 Cal.Rptr . 174].)

Secondary Sources

12 W itkin, Summary of California Law (1 1th ed. 2017) Real Property , §§ 753, 756,

CACI No. 4302 UNLA WFUL DET AINER

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1 California Landlord-T enant Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed.) §§ 8.35-8.45

1 California Eviction Defense Manual (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed.) §§ 5.2, 6.17-6.37

Friedman et al., California Practice Guide: Landlord-T enant, Ch. 5-G, Eviction

Contr ols , ¶¶ 5:224.3, 5:277.1 et seq. (The Rutter Group)

Friedman et al., California Practice Guide: Landlord-T enant, Ch. 7-C, Bases For

T erminating T enancy , ¶ 7:96 (The Rutter Group)

7 California Real Estate Law and Practice, Ch. 210, Unlawful Detainer , §§ 210.21,

210.22 (Matthew Bender)

Matthew Bender Practice Guide: California Landlord-T enant Litigation, Ch. 5,

Unlawful Detainer , 5.07

29 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 333, Landlor d and T enant:

Eviction Actions , § 333.10 (Matthew Bender)

Miller & Starr , California Real Estate 4th, § 19:200 (Thomson Reuters)

UNLA WFUL DET AINER CACI No. 4302

Page last reviewed May 2024

Austin Sarat

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